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Article 13

NOTES
argued in favor of trying the case at the most suitable location for all parties
concerned.
Thus, the old epithets advanced in support of the immunity of non-residents acquire a new meaning when trial convenience is made the basis of the
privilege. Such a modification of the historical approach to the problem seems
justified. 40 In'some cases the non-resident should be immune from service of
process-in others he should not. Efficient judicial administration demands
that immunity be extended or withheld according to the particular facts of each
41
case. The cardinal consideration should be the convenience of the participants.

TORT LIABILITY OF PARENT TO MINOR CHILD
In Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951), a four year old child was
allowed to recover damages from her father's estate for the infliction by the
parent of a willful and malicious injury.' Although this result may not be
inconsistent with either justice or the early common law,2 it directly conflicts
40. That an indiscriminate application of immunity is capable of producing absurd
results is made evident by Petrova v. Roberts, 216 App. Div. 814, 216 N.Y. Supp. 897
(2d Dep't. 1926). There it was held that the non-resident was immune from process in an
independent action instituted by the defendant where the Civil Practice Act in effect at the
time forbade a counterclaim of this nature. Had the counterclaim not been prohibited by
statute, the defendant would have been given an opportunity to have his claim against
the non-resident plaintiff *adjudicated. It would seem inconsistent to say judicial administration will be disrupted by a non-resident's subjection to suits based on an independent
cause of action but not by subjection to suits on facts more closely related and ordinarily
assertable as a counterclaim.
41. As a criterion for guiding the courts in determining whether immunity should
be granted, the language of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), is pertinent:
"Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof ; availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance
of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a cast easy, expeditious
and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if
one is obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to a fair
trial. . . . Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought
not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.
In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is'reason for holding the trial in
their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn
of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home."
1. The father murdered the mother and then committed suicide, all in the presence
of the child.
2. "The ancient common law did not, it appears, expressly deny to a child a right
of action against a parent for personal injury. . . ." Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1948). "There has never been a common law rule that a child could not sue
its parent." Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 Atl. 905, 906 (1930). Briggs v. City
of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 Atl. 871 (1934), discusses the same point; and at
43 HARv. L. REV. 1082 (1930), it is said: "...
the few clear decisions we have go
back no further than 1891."
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with a series of cases commencing in 18913 and uniformly holding that no
tort action may be maintained by a child against his parents.4 A single uncited
case serves as precedent for the Mahnke decision.' The doctrine against such
recovery, which many have considered to be irrefutable, has its foundation
in what has been called public policy.' This policy has served to preclude action
by a daughter who had been raped by her father,7 and to prevent suit by a girl
against her stepmother for a violent beating with a horse whip.' It has been
extended, with but few exceptions, so as absolutely to prevent a minbr from
suing his parent in tort.
In establishing that there could be no remedy for the child, the courts
have determined that to permit such actions would disturb the tranquillity of
the home,9 undermine parental authority'0 and make family discipline difficult."
The action has also been denied on the ground that an award of
damages might deprive other dependents of support 2 and, should the plaintiffCriminal sanctions 14
child die, the parent would succeed to the damages.'
and natural affection" have been thought to be the proper preventives of un3. Hewellett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), held, without citations, that a
married child, separated from her husband and living with her mother was unemancipated,
and therefore could not recover from her mother for the latter's malicious imprisonment
of the child in an insane asylum.
4. Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Wood v. Wood, 135
Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895); Taubert v.
Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1907) ; Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W.
188 (1931); Goheen v. Goheen, 9 N.J. Misc. 507, 154 Atl. 393 (1931); Mannion v.
Mannion, 3 N.J. Misc. 68, 129 Atl. 431 (1925); Thickman v. Thickman, 88 N.Y.S.2.d
284 (1949); Lento v. Hajick, 16 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1939); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 222
App. Div. 835, 226 N.Y. Supp. 907 (1938) ; Ciana v. Ciana, 127 N.Y. Misc. 305, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 767 (1926); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v.
Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888
(1930) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938). See COOLEY, TORTS
§ 174 (4th ed. 1932) ; SCHOULER, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 691 (6th ed. 1921).
5. Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Ore. 1950), where a father and son were killed
in an automobile accident resulting from the reckless driving of the intoxicated father.
It was held that an unemancipated minor child may maintain an action against its parent
for a willful or malicious personal tort. The case is noted in 14 U. OF DETROIT L.J. 94
(1951) ; 29 N.C.L. REV. 214 (1951) ; 4 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1951).
6. The policy-doctrine was stated initially in Hewellett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711,
9 So. 885, 887 (1891). See also XfcCurdy, Torts Between Persons ir Domestic Relations,
43 I-ARv. L. REV. 1080 (1930).
7. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
8. Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
9. Small v. Mbrrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N.W. 787 (1927).
10. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
11. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) ; Matarese v. Matarese,
supra note 10; Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927). See also ScHouLFR, op.
cit. supra note 4, at § 691.
12. Roller v. Roller, supra note 11.
13. Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
14. Ibid.
15. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939).
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conscionable treatment by the parent. These propositions have been accepted
without consideration of their applicability to the facts of particular cases.
The consistent denial of this right to the child has been obtained by singularly inconsistent methods. Thus in states where the common law forbids
actions between husband and wife,'" it has been found reasonable that a similar
rule should apply to those between parent and child.' 7 But where a state
permits husband-wife suits, the courts have held that the relationship is not at
all comparable.'" The apparent analogy of the long established right of a child
to sue its parent in connection with property" has been distinguished from the
right of a child to sue in tort.2" This is accomplished by presuming that entertaining a complaint accusing a father of doing his son out of property is less
likely to disturb the domestic harmony than one accusing him of causing a
personal injury.
The first departure from the general rule was based upon the reasoning
that the presence of insurance would create a cause of action." Subsequently
other exceptions were established. Some courts have felt that public policy
recognizes somewhat less value in the tranquillity of the family of adoptive
parents, 2- or ones in loco parenti, 23 than in the homes of blood parents, and
have, therefore, permitted actions by the child. A wrongful death statute
has been construed to permit a child as- survivor of the deceased parent to
bring an action against the other parent for causing death. 4 And a statute
requiring insurance for certain activities has been interpreted as requiring not
only indemnity for the parent but protection for all who may be injured, in2
cluding the defendant's children. 5
16. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877) ; Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75

N.W. 278 (1898).
17. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
18. Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 86, 145 Ati. 753, 755 (1929) : "The suggested
analogy between the action of a wife against her husband for personal injuries through
his negligence, which we permit, and a like action by a child against his parents, is not
a close one.
19. The earliest case on record in this connection appears to be Anonymous, Y.B.
2 Edw. 2 (1308), in Selden Soc. 35 (1888). More recent cases are: Young v. Wiley,
183 Ind. 449, 107 N.E. 278 (1915), which permitted a suit to declare void a judgment
affecting the title of real estate; and McKern v. Beck, 73 Ind. App. 92, 126 N.E. 641
(1920), which held that where there was no evidence of fraud, an action to quiet title
may be maintained between parent and child.
20. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
21. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atil. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). See
18 B.U.L. REv. 468 (1938); 9 U. OF PrT. L. REv. 310 (1948); 26 GEo. L.J. 139 (1937);
8 DUKE B.A.J. 58 (1930).
22. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939).
23. Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Classen v.
Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903) ; Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730
(1885).
24. Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d 461 (1936).
25. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
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Many of the opinions indicate, but do not decide, that a right of action by
a child should be recognized more generally. Where an employee-parent has
been negligent and his employer is vicariously liable, it has been held that an
action by the child against the employer will lie, even though the employer
may later recover from the parent for breach of the agency contract." In
several of the cases denying the right of action, assertions have been made
7
that to avoid liability there must be an absence of willful misconduct.
Others, by dictum, have limited immunity to simple negligence and injuries
connected with the family relationship.2
Cowgill v. Boock,29 in finding a right of action arising from willful misconduct and not from incidental circumstances, furnishes the only case authority for the Mahnke decision. In the Cowgill opinion the court had the opportunity to base parental liability upon either insurance"0 or statutory changes
in public policy."1 It relied upon neither. The case was treated as involving
a breach of duty resulting in a right of action. While this is the usual course
of procedure in most controversies, it was unique in the field of parent-child
tort suits, and established a precedent which logically may be followed in
other fact situations.
M/dahnke v. Moore, without reference to the Cowgill case, has pursued the
same course and arrived at the same.conclusion. Prior to these two cases the
reasons for granting a right of action have been no less tenuous than those
26. That a child may recover from a third party to whom the parent will be liable has
been held in Chase v. New Haven Material Co., 111 Conn. 377, 50 Atl. 107 (1930) ; Foy
v. Foy Electric Co., 231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E.2d 418 (1950) ; Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503,
50 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Briggs v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 Atl. 871
(1934).
27. Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 N.Y. Misc. 551, 92 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1949), permitted the
plaintiff-child to amend the complaint so as to allege willful misconduct, and stated that
under proof of such an allegation the mother might be liable. See also Canon v. Canon,
287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
28. Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 Atl. 74 (1937), based immunity upon passive
negligence incident to the parental relation. In Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App.
206, 211, 61 N.E. 691 (1901), it is stated: "And it may be admitted that there may be
good ground for questioning an infant child's right of action against its father or against
the mother, as head of the family, but we are not prepared to say that in no case should
such an action be allowed." And in Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 2, 156 S.E. 750,
751 (1931), the following statement is found: "The basis of this rule . . . lies in the
very vital interest which society has in preserving harmony in domestic relations, and in
not permitting families to be torn asunder by suits for damages by petulant, insolent, or
ungrateful children against their parents for real or fancied grievances. . . . But
whether the rule should be carried to the extent, as some cases have done, of denying
an infant the right to maintain an action for damages against his parent for injury
inflicted with evil intention and from wicked motives, is a question not now before us."
See also Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45. Ga. App. 1, 11, 163 S.E. 708, 712 (1932) ; 7 FORD L.
REV. 459 (1938).

29. 218 P.2d 445 (Ore. 1950).
30. See 30 ORE. L. Rav. 86 (1950).
31. The action was brought under a wrongful death statute by the child's administrator and was susceptible to the same treatment as that in Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 449,
7 A.2d 461 (1936).
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given for denying it. If it is the domestic tranquillity which the courts seek to
defend without defining, the non-liability rule should be no less appropriate
for adoptive parents than for blood parents. 32 Some argue that the natural
affection existing between a father and mother and their child by birth is sufficient protection against tortious abuse, and consequently a suit between a
child and its adoptive parent may be allowed since this natural affection is lacking.13 The fallacy of such an argument is apparent on its face. The commission of an intentional wrong would appear to demonstrate the absence of at
least a significant measure of affection regardless of the origin of the child;
and it can hardly be contended that natural love will prevent a negligent wrong
already sustained. 4 It is difficult to perceive why criminal sanctions, relied
on to prevent injury, should be used to deny redress when the injury has occurred," and so create the unusual situation of permitting the injured child to
be prosecuting witness but denying him the role of plaintiff."' it is also difficult to see how insurance can create a right of action where none would otherwise exist.3 7

Practically, the problem of a child suing its parent will seldom

arise where there is no insurance and the parent is a pauper. But it would riot
be claimed that the right of action should be contingent upon the wealth of the
defendant; neither should it be contingent upon the presence of insurance.
In a few instances where recovery has been allowed or exceptions to the
rule stated, the courts perhaps have been thinking of the effect of the many
factors of the domestic relationship upon the measure of damages, while
speaking of their effect upon the right of action. A large majority, however,
have .denied the action without going beyond the parent-child" relationship to
consider the facts surrounding it. Had they done so, as did the court in
Mahuke v. Mlfoore, they might have found that a tort action is no more likely
to disturb the family tranquillity than one for property ;38 that family discipline
is not undermined where the act complained of was beyond the domestic relationship and did not occur in the exercise of parental authority ;39 and that
32. See Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 687, 300 Pac. 7 (1931) ; Samborski v. Beck,

41 D. &C. 387 (Pa. Comm. 1941).

33. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W. 245 (1931), stated that parental immunity
is based upon the natural love of the parent for the child, of which there is no presumption
in the case of foster parents.
34. HARPER, ToRTs § 285 (1933).
35. See Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939).
36. See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) ; Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901).
37. See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1948) : "The existence of
liability insurance ought not to create a cause of action where none exists otherwise";
and Bulloch v. Bulloch, 163 S.E. 708, 712 (Ga. 1932) : "Moreover, the fact that defendant
father carried liability insurance upon his automobile would be irrelevant ..
38. See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929).
39. See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708, 711 (1932): "We do not
hold that a father could not be held liable for a malicious wrong or for some act of
cruelty which operated at the same time to forfeit his parental authority."
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a suit against an employer accusing a parent of a wrong with subsequent recovery from the parent is not so entirely different from suing and recovering
directly from the parent as to justify opposite results.4"
It is not to be contended that for every improper act by a parent there
should be recovery. If the action is for an injury occurring in the course of
reasonable family discipline it should be considered privileged, and allowing
the action, the privilege may be shown by way of defense. If there is sufficient
evidence of fraud, or if the defendant-parent would succeed to the whole
damages, necessarily there should be no recovery. Where these extreme circumstances are absent, however, the balance between the harm complained
of and the effect of recovery upon the future relations of parent and child
should determine the measure of damages and not affect the right of action.
So if it should be found-from the facts of the case, not from the dogma of
parental immunity-that a substantial recovery would cause disturbance of
the home far out of proportion to the benefit to be derived from the award
by the child, nominal damages only should be given. The denial of a parentchild action without consideration of the circumstances surrounding the relationship implies a presumption of parental righteousness which a long series
of cases clearly invalidates.4 1
Mahnke v. Moore was considered upon demurrer contesting the right of
a child to proceed against his parent in tort. Had the court decided that no
such right existed, manifestly it could not have considered the realities of the
case-that both father and mother were dead and the home already destroyed.
In permitting this action it appears that the court has made a rational approach
to the problem of child-parent tort suits.
40. See Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933) ; Graham v. Miller,
182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) ; Mahaf fey v. Mahaf fey, 15 Tenn. App. 570 (1932).
41. HARPER, TORTS § 285 (1933), suggests that an action be allowed "either by a
parent or a child in every case in which it is reasonably clear that the domestic peace
has already been disturbed ..
"

